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RAILROAD BANKRUPTCY ACT
PROCEDURAL DELAYS IN RECENT AMENDMENTS
TO THE RAILROAD BANKRUPTCY ACT
BY LEIGHTON SHIELDS
It has often been observed that enactments directed to amend
existing statutory laws are best made after the statute has been
in effect long enough to have been exposed to analysis arising
out of litigation. Whenever a leading court decision construes
some statute which soon thereafter is amended by the legislature,
it is commonly assumed that the function of the amendment was
intended to meet the demonstrated need for change; and that the
amendment was effected in view of such decision.
While the sequence of events following the enactment of the
Railroad Bankruptcy Act of 19331 include an interpretation of
that statute by the federal Supreme Court in the Rock Island
case2 and an amendment of that Act by the Congress during its
74th session3 nothing warrants the inference that new matter in
the Act of 1935 was added because of any judicial criticism of
the Act of 1933. On the contrary the mandate for expeditious
legal procedure contained in the Rock Island case is still the law
of the case for each step of the procedure prescribed by the Act
of 1935 as well as the Act of 1933 which this decision construes.
The Act of 1933 through Section 77 added to the commonly
recognized bankruptcy jurisdiction of the federal courts, a new
system of procedure for the relief of railroad corporations in
need of reorganization and financing.
Because of the public interest in railroads the necessity for dis-
patch in the pace of these reorganization proceedings was vital.
The Act of 1933 enacted by the 72nd Congress met these demands
for a simplified procedure for reorganizations with particular
force and afforded a smoothly working, comprehensive code with
few defects. The Act was drafted to avoid recognized defects in-
volved in the former method of reorganizations through the
equity receivership and the foreclosure sale. -It has often been
shown that the clumsiness of the equity procedure was easily
appropriated by those desiring postponement from ultimate lia-
1 Act of March 3, 1933, C. 204, 47 Stat. 1467.
2 Cont. Ill. Bank & Tr. Co. v. C. R. I. & P. R. R. Co. (1935) 294 U. S.
648.
3 Act of Aug. 27, 1935, Pub. No. 381-74th Congress.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
bility and delay for their selfish ends; and that the cost of the
relief through this procedure was wasteful.
These practices largely contributed to the demand for the new
code of procedure contained in Act of 1933 and applied to rail-
roads through Section 77 of that Act. But the spirit of change
in these times created new demands in this regard and the code
contained in the Act of 1933 has been displaced by a still newer
code covering this same field.
The first decision by the Supreme Court construing the Act of
1933 was rendered in the Rock Island case4 on April 1, 1935. The
occasion of this decision was accidentally timed to the program of
amending the Act of 1933 undertaken by the Federal Coordinator
of Transportation; and I believe it may be truthfully asserted
that the Act of 1935 was not intended to overrule the Supreme
Court as to any part of the decision in the Rock Island case.
Section 77 of the Act of 1935 was intended as an entirely new
code of procedure to revamp, and not merely to correct, features
of the Act of 1933 which had been found cumbersome in execu-
tion.
While the Act of 1935 adopted many features of the proceed-
ings under the Act of 1933, it did not constitute merely a textual
correction of the former statute relating to details of practice.
The new act contains over a dozen new subsections different from
those in Section 77 of the. former statute, and not one-half of
that number of amended subsections which have been recast from
the contents of old subsections.
In the Rock Island case the court found that Section 77 of the
Act of 1933 was properly within the field of valid bankruptcy
legislation under Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 4 of the Constitution. The
court said Sec. 77 "advances another step in the direction of
liberalizing the law on the subject of bankruptcies" and stated
that equity receiverships were found an unsatisfactory method
for reorganizing railroad corporations.
After emphasizing the scope of the equity powers of the trial
court to "make such orders, issue such process and enter such
judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may
be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act
[U. S. C. title 11, sec. 2 (15)]," the court sustained the authority
4 Supra, note 2.
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of the lower court to enjoin the sale of collateral held by a credi-
tor and justified its finding with convincing reasons.
The direction for a speedy handling of all reorganizations un-
der the 1933 Act was laid down as a general rule of procedure;
and this as applied to Section 77 of the Act of 1935, as well as
to the former statute, becomes the rule of action which will go
far to implement the present law as a satisfactory method for
railroad reorganizations if it is found otherwise workable.
In this Rock Island decision the court warned that all such
proceedings should go forward without delay or suffer the pen-
alty of being dismissed by the trial court.
In discussing the issues raised by the petitioners in the case
the court through Mr. Justice Sutherland said:
"Finally, petitioners insist with much force that the in-
junction, granted in November, 1933, and still operative, is
likely, if continued, to result in irreparable injury... It is
true that no plan has yet been consummated; and, so far as
the record shows, none has been prepared or is in the course
of preparation. If this long delay were without adequate
excuse, the retention of the injunction for a long period
which has intervened since it was granted could not be justi-
fied. But the delay is obviously due to the many doubts and
uncertainties arising from the present litigation. Until they
are finally resolved the consummation or even the prepara-
tion, of any definite plan is plainly impracticable. With these
doubts and uncertainties now removed the proceeding should
go forward to completion without further delay, or be dis-
missed.
"The delay and expense incident to railroad receiverships
and foreclosure sales constituted probably, the chief reasons
which induced the passage of Section 77; and to permit the
perpetuation of either of these evils under this new legisla-
tion would be subversive of the spirit in which it was con-
ceived and adopted. Not only are those who institute the
proceeding and those who carry it forward bound to exer-
cise the highest degree of diligence, but it is the duty of the
court and of the Interstate Commerce Commission to see
that they do. Proceedings of this character, involving pub-
lic and private interests of such magnitude, should, so far
as practicable, be given the right of way both by the court
and by the Commission to the end that they may be speedily
determined."
This rule of the Supreme Court requiring speed in carrying
forward all reorganization proceedings has not been changed by
Washington University Open Scholarship
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any intendment which can be read into the Act of 1935. On the
other hand the practical result of the many checks between the
trial judge and the Interstate Commerce Commission created in
the new procedure under this Act will tend definitely to retard
all proceedings of reorganization, and prevent both the courts
and the Commission from attaining the same speed in disposal
of cases as was generally possible under the former statute.
Numerous features of the earlier act have been cited as weak-
nesses which tended towards unreasonable delays. These include
the difficulty sometimes experienced in the reorganization of the
larger western railroad systems where the great number of
classes of creditors made it difficult to procure a full 2/3 consent
of interested parties.
To critics of the earlier statute this experience justifies a
change carried out in the Act of 1935 requiring a 2/3 consent
merely of those voting on the plan of reorganization, instead of
the former requirement of consents of 2/3 of all of each class of
creditors and stockholders. In practice it may be just as difficult
to meet the present requirements of the 1935 Act in this regard
as it proved to be in the unusual case under the 1933 Act.
The change seems to mark a distinction with little practical
difference; but a fuller discussion of changes effected by the 1935
Act to facilitate the procedure will be noted in detail in later
paragraphs.
From a'general comparison of the two statutes it has been cal-
culated that under the Act of 1933 in an uncontested case a final
decree of confirmation of a plan of reorganization could be en-
tered within 60 days from the time of filing the copy of the plan
with the court; but that under the Act of 1935 a minimum of
390 days would be required before all of the necessary steps
could be taken and such decree entered notwithstanding no un-
reasonable delays are experienced in the presentation of the case.
This estimation of the delays possible under the new procedure
places in a new light the importance of the rule of the Rock
Island case in regard to carrying through with dispatch all pend-
ing reorganization proceedings. But conceding the importance of
this decision and its salutary effect upon proceedings under the
Act, it can not muster an effect which will overcome the delays
which will be occasioned by the multiplicity of steps required by
the Act for the preparation and confirmation of the plan of re-
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organization. In this regard it appears that the authors of the
Act of 1935 may have lost sight of the desired object and become
too intent upon details of the instrumentality through which the
results are to be gained.
It is not intended to condemn many of the new features of the
Act as undesirable, but whatever gains have been made in that
regard are at the expense of loss of dispatch in procedure to such
a degree that it may be forcibly stated that the whole remedy
afforded by the Act has fallen into that evil so often exposed as
poor economy and bad legal practice-the proverbial delays in
legal procedure.
A cursory examination of the steps required in an ordinary
reorganization proceeding under the new Act and a few con-
trasts with the Act of 1933 will serve to illustrate these con-
clusions.
Under both acts all proceedings are started in a federal court
according to jurisdictional requirements by the filing of a peti-
tion alleging the "debtor" corporation insolvent or unable to pay
its debts as they mature and that the "debtor" desires to effect a
reorganization under Section 77.
Both acts provide for the court to take jurisdiction, when the
petition is approved by the judge, over the subject of action, the
res and over the person of all interested parties wherever located.
Certain subsidiaries and affiliates of a parent "debtor" may
join or be joined with it in the same original proceedings for re-
organization.
Plans of reorganization are required to include proposals to
modify and alter the rights of "creditors" (the meaning of this
term being given a wide scope), either through the issue of new
securities or otherwise; and to include adequate means for carry-
ing into effect all provisions of the plan.
Parties in interest included in the meaning of the term "credi-
tors" and stockholders of the debtor corporation must submit to
the jurisdiction of the trial court notwithstanding they are not
residents of the judicial district of the trial court.
None are denied their day in court, but it is to the court taking
jurisdiction, after approving the petition fied in the case, that
these creditors and stockholders must look for relief.
In many details the Acts are similar; but they differ radically
regarding necessary requirements relating to the building of the
plan and the supervision thereof by the Commission.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
For example, the Commission now has a broad discretion in
regard to its right to disapprove a plan of reorganization without
a reciprocal obligation to formulate or approve a substitute plan.
This was not possible under the Act of 1933 which required the
Commission to report and recommend some plan of reorganiza-
tion within a reasonable time.6
While subsection (d) of the Act of 1935 requires the Commis-
sion to report and state fully the reasons for its conclusions in
refusing to approve any plan, there is no judicial procedure pro-
vided for reviewing this action of the Commission, and the Act
affords no rules or standards for the proper conduct of the Com-
mission in this regard.
The importance of this power in the Commission to withhold
approval from a plan of reorganization lies in the fact that no
plan may be approved by the trial judge under the 1935 Act un-
less the plan has first been approved by the Commission.7
While the Commission might be justified in its action in re-
fusing to approve any plan of reorganization there could be a
wide difference of opinion in that regard; and such situation
would bring the proceedings to a standstill, for which there ap-
pears to be no remedy. Valuable as is the rule of the Rock sland
case to keep proceedings moving, its force can not be applied in
this regard to the Act of 1935 because of the difference of its pro-
visions from the Act of 1933 which provided an obligation on
the part of the Commission to report and recommend some plan
of reorganization within a reasonable time.
Another example of departure from simplified procedure re-
suiting from provisions of the present statute is included in the
requirement that the trial judge must hear all parties in interest
in support of, and in opposition to, objections to the plan and
claims for equitable treatment.,
It would seem that a hearing de novo required in this connec-
tion is unnecessarily wide in scope considering the fact that the
plan submitted to this hearing must already have been subjected
to a hearing before the Commission and must be reported to the
5 Act approved Aug. 27, 1935, Subsection (d).6 Act of March 3, 1933, C. 204, Sec. 1, Subsection (d); U. S. C. title 11,
sec. 205, Subsection (d).T Act approved Aug. 27, 1935, subsection (d).8 Act of Aug. 27, 1935, subsection (e).
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trial court as approved before further action may be taken upon
it. The hearing on the plan at this stage should be limited to
specific objections relevant to vital features of the plan and
should be extended to no other persons except those who would
have had such a right prior to the time the railroads passed into
the hands of the court for administration; otherwise, the trial
court will be involved unnecessarily in retracing steps already
covered by the Commission.
Unfortunately the text of the act is clearly susceptible of a
direction requiring that the function of the hearing extend to
general features of every claim or objection involved in the ques-
tion whether equitable treatment has been given to parties in
interest. The scope of such hearings would extend to questions
relating to the business management of the road during reor-
ganization-a field in which the trial judge should be permitted
to rely upon the representatives appointed by him alone.
For the trial court to be required to hear all parties interested
in this regard, in support of and in opposition to objections to
the plan of reorganization and its administration, the result will
be that the door will be opened to a variety of issues which must
finally be settled before the court validly can follow the canons
of the Act and take the next step of weighing the plan in the
light of the standards set up by subsection (e).
Arbitrary action on the part of the trial judge to limit these
hearings might afford grounds upon which plausible exceptions
could be made against the final order of confirmation of the plan
of reorganization. In this provision the procedure directed by the
1935 Act for a hearing de novo before the trial court appears
unnecessarily elaborate and much slower in action than the pro-
visions of the Act of 1933 covering similar functions to be fol-
lowed for the approval of the plan.
Another feature of practice under the present act which will
slow up the procedure is the requirement that the trial judge may
approve the plan and transmit it to the Commission for creditors'
and stockholders' action in regard thereto, only after the judge
has found that it includes several elements necessary to all plans
of reorganization. 9
These elements are somewhat similar to the fundamentals re-
9 Act approved Aug. 27, 1935, subsection (b).
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quired under similar circumstances by the Act of 1933, but there
is a new feature included in the present law which gives rise to
much conjecture and affords a very considerable obstacle to
speedy court action in the hard case, although its purpose mani-
festly is to expedite the procedure connected with obtaining
necessary consents to the plan.
Before the proceedings. go farther, both the Commission and
the trial judge must have found that the plan is fair and equi-
table; affords due recognition to the rights of each class of credi-
tors and stockholders; does not discriminate unfairly in favor
of any class of creditors or stockholders and will conform to the
requirements of the law of the land regarding the participation
of the various classes of creditors and stockholders (italics sup-
plied) ;1o that all expenses of the reorganization have been dis-
closed and are reasonable within the limits fixed by the Commis-
sion; and that adequate provisions have been made for the pay-
ment of costs and allowances.
This finding by the Commission and by the trial judge that the
plan will conform to the requirements of the law of the land re-
garding the participation of the various classes of creditors and
stockholders was not essential prior to the Act of 1935.
According to the House debate on the hill known as H. R. 8587
(Public #381, 74th Congress) this requirement was inserted to
insure certain features of the Act from invalidation by the courts.
In this regard Representatives Sumners and Biermann are re-
ported in the Congressional Record as follows:
Mr. Sumners of Texas. The most important change is that
whereas under the present law there is required the consent
of two-thirds of each class, it is made possible for the Com-
mission and the court, after consideration of the plan-and
they may modify the plan-if it is a fair and just plan and
meets the constitutional requirements, it is possible to have
a plan effectuated which has not been approved by two-
thirds of each class...
.Mr. Biermann. It now takes two-thirds and under your
plan it states no definite number?
Mr. Sumners. That is right; and we feel that we have
protected the constitutionality of the bill by providing that
the plan must meet with-I have not the exact language of
1oIdem., subsection (e) clause (1).
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the bill in my mind-but it must comply with the law of the
land.1
From the report of this debate it is manifest that the drafters
of the Act of 1935 considered the provisions included in Sub-
section (e) as vital in order to validate the power of the trial
judge to confirm a plan already rejected by stockholders and/or
creditors of the debtor corporation.
This power of the trial judge is expressed in a proviso follow-
ing directions concerning the confirmation of the plan by the
judge, when satisfied it has been accepted by or on behalf of
creditors of each class to which submission is required who hold
more than two-thirds in amount of the total of allowed claims
of such class which have been reported as voting on the plan;
and similarly by or on behalf of stockholders.
The proviso in question reads as follows:
Provided, That, if the plan has not been accepted by the
creditors and stockholders, the judge may nevertheless con-
firm the plan if he is satisfied and finds, after hearing, that
it makes adequate provision for fair and equitable treatment
for interests or claims of those rejecting it; that such rejec-
tion is not reasonably justified in the light of the respective
rights and interests of those rejecting it and all the relevant
facts; and that the plan conforms to the requirements of
clauses (1) to (3), inclusive of the first paragraph of this
subsection (e) .12
One can not refrain from observing that the clause in question
gives little help to the trial judge by setting up guides or stand-
ards as a rule of conduct in the hard case, but passes entire
responsibility upon the trial judge to apply the remedy properly
in the given case. This situation will probably give rise to many
exceptions, should the court override dissentors to the plan; and
also it will contribute little towards facilitating these proceed-
ings by speeding up procedure.
It may be objected that my criticism will apply only to the
occasional case and that ordinarily no issue will arise to put the
proviso to a test. Granting the truth of this, there still remains
the question of the usefulness of the proviso. In considering our
convictions are we not to resolve the matter by admitting that the
11 Congressional Record, August 15, 1936, page 13770.
12 Act of August 27, 1935, subsection (e), paragraph 3.
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only safe procedure will be to rely on obtaining the 2/8 consents
of stockholders and creditors to the plan, and that the Act of
1935 offers in this regard little improvement for speed of pro-
cedure over the provisions of the earlier act.
In this discussion it has been the purpose of the writer to
analyze the changes in the practice in the light of their effect
upon the facilitating the speed of reorganizations.
While other additions to the Act of 1933 serve purposes proper
for the full control by the court and by the Commission of con-
duct of stockholders' and creditors' committees, as well as of
trustees appointed by the court, none of these additions are of
such nature that they could not also have been added to the
former equity practice as extensions of the jurisdiction of the
court and the Commission.
These additions are in line with the policy of centralization of
control of the nation's transportation and communications' facili-
ties which policy can be heartily endorsed. They are only sub-
ject to criticism in so far as the procedure in the given case
through accumulation of many steps necessarily results in de-
laying the procedure to a degree that the-means seems to defeat
the object of its consummation.
Among valuable improvements of the Act of 1935, I call atten-
tion to provisions which relate to the valuation of the debtors'
property by the Commission ;1 the discretion given to the court
to restrain the foreclosure of the debtors' property ;14 authoriza-
tion of options or participations under the plan to safeguard
interests of creditors or stockholders who can not presently avail
themselves of the opportunity to take part in the plan at the price
of the sacrifice of their respective interests ;15 the supervision of
creditors' committees and the regulation by the Commission of
fees and allowances ;16 the duty of trustees to file a list of bond
holders and creditors with the court for public information and
a report disclosing the conduct of the management of the debtors'
affairs ;17 the right to authorize trustees' certificates similar to
the issue of receivers" certificate under the equity practice;18 the
13 Act of Aug. 27, 1935, subsection (e).
14 Act of Aug. 27, 1935, subsection (j).
15 Act of Aug. 27, 11935, subsection (p).
'I Act of Aug. 27, 1935, subsection (c) (12).
17 Act of Aug. 27, 1935, subsection (c) (4).
Is Act of Aug. 27, 1935, subsection (c) (3).
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method to be employed in order to sell secondary railroad lines
unprofitable to the parent corporation and to annul executory
contracts and leases binding the debtor corporation ;:1 and regu-
lations requiring the appointment of trustees independent of the
railroad management where the annual operating revenues of the
debtor corporation exceed one million dollars.
2 0
It will be noted in this connection that the aggregate effect of
those provisions of the Act of 1935 is to extend the supervisory
authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission, an end salu-
tary, perhaps, but yielding the immediate result of delay in the
progress otherwise possible under less elaborate reorganization
proceedings.
This enlargement of the supervisory power of the Commission
may be indispensable in the case of the reorganization of the
great railroad lines, but it is to be remarked that the elaborate
system of checks between the court and the Commission which
accompanies these provisions under the act seem needlessly to
require the retracing of steps already intrusted to a dependable
authority.
The present statute shows a spirit conscious of the delays
which are entailed in its elaborate system of supervision over the
building of the final plan. The Act provides against this by re-
quiring that a plan of reorganization must be filed by the debtor
whether six months from the entry of the order by the judge of
the trial court approving the filing of a petition for reorganiza-
tion under the Act, among other things; but the trial judge may
extend the time for filing the plan from time to time, no single
extension to be for more than 6 months.
The present act like the Act of 1933 includes the provision
that when, in the light of all of the circumstances, there is undue
delay in a reorganization proceeding, the trial judge, after hear-
ing and a consideration of the recommendation of the Commis-
sion in that connection, may dismiss the proceedings and return
the property to the debtors' management or as the court may
direct.2 1
The rule supplied by the Supreme Court in the Rock Island
case will apply with renewed force to reorganizations under the
19 Act of Aug. 27, 1935, subsection (o).
20 Act of Aug. 27, 1935, subsection (e).
21 Act of Aug. 27, 1935, subsection (g).
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present act. Its warning that reorganizatiozis must be expedi-
tiously pressed still holds good.
. "The delay and expense incident to railroad receivership and
foreclosure sales constituted, probably, the chief reasons which
induced the passage of Section 77; and to permit the perpetua-
tion of these evils under this new legislation would be subversive
of the spirit in which it was conceived and adopted. Not only are
those who institute the proceeding and those who carry it for-
ward bound to exercise the highest degree of diligence, but it is
the duty of the court and of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion to see that they do."22
Undoubtedly the courts and the Commission reasonably will do
their part in expediting these proceedings in so far as the Act of
1935 permits, but it is also necessary that parties to the proceed-
ings will be constantly alert to keep the procedure in motion so
that it will be saved from the stigma of delay which the investing
public attributes to most litigation.
22 Cent. Ill. B. & T. Co. v. C. R. I. & P. R. R. Co. (1935) 294 U. S. 648.
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